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Many attempts to define privacy have been made over the last 
century. Early definitions and theories of privacy had little to do 
with the concept of information and, when they did, only in an 
informal sense. With the advent of information technology, the 
question of a precise and universally acceptable definition of 
privacy in this new domain became an urgent issue as legal and 
business problems regarding privacy started to accrue. In this 
paper, I propose a definition of informational privacy that is simple, 
yet strongly tied with the concepts of information and property. 
Privacy thus defined is similar to intellectual property and should 
receive commensurate legal protection. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Many attempts to define privacy have been made since the 
publication of the seminal paper by Warren and Brandeis [26]. 
With the advent of information technology, the question of precise 
and universally acceptable definition of privacy became an urgent 
issue as legal and business problems regarding privacy started 
accruing. The problem is compounded by the fact that the 
traditional concept of privacy which covered only intimate and 
sensitive information left out many other aspects of our life 
represented today in digital form. This tension has led some 
researchers to coin a new phrase, informational privacy [4], [16], 
[3], [18], distinct from, and to be treated differently than, the 
traditional object (or objects) of privacy. However, no agreement 
has been reached yet as to what this “new” concept of privacy is 
supposed to cover and what right it represents. In fact, extending 
privacy beyond its traditional domain muddled even further 
                                                                
1 Roughly speaking, personal information is any information about me; its precise 
meaning will be explained in Section 3. 
philosophical and legal discussion on the subject; as Judith 
Thomson observed [21, p. 286] “Perhaps the most striking thing 
about the right to privacy is that nobody seems to have any very 
clear idea what it is”. The goal of this paper is thus modest: I will 
not attempt to provide yet another definition of privacy that covers 
all its aspects; I will concentrate here on informational privacy 
only. 
The informational privacy regulation in the US has its origin in the 
set of recommendations, called Fair Information Practices (FIP), 
proposed by the US government advisory committee in 1973. There 
are five main principles of fair information [6]: 
 There shall be no personal records systems whose 
existence is secret; 
 Individuals have rights of access, inspection, review, 
and amendment to systems containing information 
about them; 
 There must be a way for individuals to prevent the use 
of information about themselves gathered for one 
purpose for another purpose without their consent; 
 Organizations and managers of systems are responsible 
for the damage done by the systems and for their 
reliability and security; 
 Governments have the right to intervene in the 
information relationships among private parties. 
The FIP doctrine is clearly outdated. As observed in [6, p. 97], its 
“most significant weakness (…) is its failure to specify a stronger 
form of the interest individuals have in their personal information. 
Under FIPs, individuals have only limited rights to control their 
personal information-rights usually limited to inspection, 
challenge, and review. A much stronger form of interest would be 
a property right rather than a mere judicial or administrative 
interest.” The idea of treating personal information1 as property 
seems very intuitive, yet it has not been widely explored. In this 
paper I develop this very idea: I propose a definition of privacy that 





property. In particular, I will argue that personal information can 
be understood as intellectual property and should receive similar 
legal protection. This is not to say that personal information is 
intellectual property; rather it shares with it – rather unique for 
property – ontological status as information. One of the most 
persuasive arguments against treating personal information as 
property has been the imprecise use of the concept of “information 
ownership” in the context of privacy protection. However, the very 
concept of intellectual property ownership which is nothing else 
than “information ownership” is well understood. Moreover, the 
legal framework for intellectual property protection has been in 
place for some time now and I believe it can be used - with some 
necessary modifications - for privacy protection as well.  
 
2 OWNERSHIP OF PERSONAL INFORMATION 
 
The fact that privacy has value is indisputable.  In most of the 
literature on privacy, however, that value is placed in the realm of 
ethics. It has been argued that privacy is an indispensable part of 
human integrity, dignity, and liberty or a necessary element of 
intimate social relationships.  Notwithstanding ethical aspects of 
privacy, one cannot miss, however, an economic element of it: 
personal information can be traded, sold, and stolen. Privacy has an 
economic, often pecuniary, value [13]. Indeed, it is the economic 
value of privacy – although not referred to as such - that is dominant 
in recent discussions of privacy. We worry that by giving away too 
much information – or by having it stolen – we are deprived of 
some good that has more than just moral value. However, for any 
good to be sold or stolen, it must be owned by someone in the first 
place. This is the main thesis of the paper: personal information is 
best understood and should be treated as property that we own (the 
precise meaning of what I mean by ownership will be spelled out 
below). 
The idea of using property rights in the context of privacy 
protection (although not as information ownership) has been 
entertained before. But all such ownership-based interpretations of 
privacy have been criticized for an unclear or metaphorical use of 
the concept of “ownership”.  The standard understanding of 
property is that it is excludable: if I own a car, you don’t; if I sell it 
to you, you own it and I do not. With this understanding of 
“ownership”, it is quite easy to mount convincing arguments 
against the ownership-based interpretations of privacy. Clearly, 
personal information is not lost when acquired by someone else 
(contrary to the standard interpretation of “ownership”). If it were, 
every release of personal information – to anyone and in any 
context – would diminish the level of our privacy. We do not 
perceive it that way. We do care, however, what happens with this 
information afterwards. If I share my marital problems with a 
friend, I do not expect this piece of information to go any further. 
Similarly, if a CCTV camera takes a picture of me walking into a 
bar at lunchtime I do not expect this information to reach my 
employer (even though the event took place in public space). In 
other words, if I provide someone with personal information that 
person or organization does not automatically acquire ownership of 
this information. This is different than selling or giving away any 
type of physical property: by selling you a car, I give up any claims 
to that car. Not so with personal information. Providing someone 
with personal information is similar (but not identical) to selling a 
license to intellectual property (such as software or industrial 
know-how). You may use this information, but you cannot – 
without my explicit permission – distribute this information any 
further. 
What sort of object or commodity are we then protecting as private 
information? How can we provide a necessary legal protection for 
objects as intangible as information? I claim that personal 
information possesses similar properties as intellectual property 
and should be protected in a similar way. Intellectual property 
applies to noncorporeal, intellectual objects such as writings, 
inventions, and secret business information. Intellectual property 
rights usually include patents, trade secrets, copyright, trademark, 
industrial design rights, trade dress, etc. For our purposes, only the 
first three are of interest (the definitions provided below are taken 
almost word for word from [7]).  
A patent is an exclusive right to use, sell, and authorize others to 
sell any expression or implementation of the protected work. A 
patent is granted for a fixed length of time but its object is publically 
disclosed. The subject matter of a patent - in contrast to a copyright 
- must be useful, novel, and nonobvious. For our purposes, the 
important feature of a patent is its public disclosure and ensuing 
dissemination of information. In return, the patent holder is granted 
the right to use, sell, and authorize others to sell the patented item.  
A trade secret is any information that can be used in the operation 
of a business or other enterprise and that is hidden and sufficiently 
valuable to afford an actual or potential advantage over the 
competitors. An owner of a trade secret has exclusive rights to use 
it as long as the secret is maintained. If the secret is made public by 
the owner (rather than obtained via improper acquisition, e.g. a 
security breach) then the secret protection lapses and anyone can 
make use of it. From our perspective, an important aspect of a trade 
secret is its protection from misappropriation. 
Copyright protects original works of authorship such as works of 
art or architecture and computer software. The domain of what can 
be copyrighted must be original and “non-utilitarian” otherwise it 
falls within the domain of patents. The principal rights that 
copyright protects are the rights to reproduce, distribute, and 
display the work publically. These rights are exclusive to the owner 
but can be sold or given up. 
Where does private information fit within this framework? Clearly, 
it is a different type of information as it does not refer to any kind 
of invention, creation, or discovery. But the protection it requires 
appears to be quite similar to the protection we afford to intellectual 
property. Private information, that is, information we hide from the 
rest of the world seems to be closest to trade secrets. A privacy 
breach in this sense is as illegal as a security breach in business. On 
the other hand, when released to the world a trade secret loses its 
legal protection whereas private information does not. Once private 
information is sold or given away by us, it becomes public, but we 
should still retain control over it. Thus, it should receive protection 
given to patents or copyrighted work. We essentially sell a 




exclusive property rights to it forever (this is different from patents 
which are granted for a fixed amount of time). In particular, a 
recipient of this information does not acquire by default the right to 
sell or distribute it any further. 
 
3 PERSONAL INFORMATION:  PRIVATE 
VERSUS PUBLIC 
 
Let us be more specific about the type of protection different 
aspects of our personality require. Every person can be described 
via (possibly infinite) conjunction of attributes. The fact 
represented by this conjunction is not necessarily (indeed, quite 
unlikely) to be known by anyone. What other people know is 
always a subset of these attributes. People acquire this knowledge 
from many diverse sources but the most vivid one is their 
encounters with us. Such encounters can be direct - when we meet 
physically face to face - but they can also be via phone 
conversations, written correspondence, or social networks. When 
such encounters take place we are able – to some degree, at least - 
control the information other people receive about us. We present 
ourselves to them in a specific way; we show them a particular 
persona, that is, a person we want to be known as. This is not to say 
that other people know about us only as much as we let them know. 
There is much information about us that is publicly available and 
as long as we choose to live among other people there is nothing 
we can do about it (only hermits enjoy almost complete 
informational isolation). But we still can and do influence how we 
are perceived by others. Consider the following two contexts when 
we clearly try to influence how we present ourselves to another 
person: a first date and a military job interview. In the first 
encounter, we will try to emphasize our physical attractiveness, 
sensitivity, sense of humor, etc. In the second encounter, we present 
ourselves as disciplined, reliable, fearless, etc. Of course, these two 
personas will share a lot in common but they are sufficiently 
different that we would not want to swap one with another in these 
two situations.  
When we create a persona, we not only decide what to include in 
it, but also what to exclude from it. Thus, it may not be a good 
strategy at the first date to release the information that our favorite 
hobby is hunting or – just the opposite - that we would never hurt a 
living creature at the military job interview.  We hide this 
information because it may hurt the prospects for a new relationship 
or a job and we try to sell ourselves the best we can. The act of 
information concealment may have a very different moral status 
depending on the type of information and the context in which it 
happens. Consider again the first date. It is morally deplorable to 
hide the fact that I am already married, but it is morally neutral to 
avoid the subject of my snoring. On the other hand, when asked 
directly about either of these two facts I have the obligation to 
answer both questions truthfully. This distinguishes these two 
aspects of my persona from yet another one where not only I can 
hide the information but also have the right to refuse to reveal it. 
                                                                
2 A fixed definition of privacy is impossible as what is considered private varies widely 
between different cultural and social contexts.  
This is the category where private information falls into. Without 
trying to provide a complete definition of private information we 
can then say that the necessary condition for the information to be 
private is the social license to hide it.2 The persona we create is a 
partial representation of the complete description of a person. Some 
of the properties are missing because they are not relevant in a 
particular context and some others are consciously hidden. Within 
the latter category, private information represents the properties 
that we are allowed to hide.  
On the other end of the spectrum there is another (public) subset of 
attributes within our persona that other people may find particularly 
interesting or valuable. A person may sell the information 
represented by these attributes thus executing his right of publicity. 
Our legal system has recognized for at least a hundred years that 
“individuals have legitimate proprietary claims to their publicity 
interests” [17, p. 673].  In many cases, the elements of a person’s 
public personality become valuable only after the investment of 
considerable time, effort, skill, and perhaps money [10, pp. 215-
216]. If a person has worked to develop sufficient value in her 
name, then that person deserves property rights to control their 
resulting profitability [22]. Since the 19th century, various courts 
have indicated that publicity interests constitute a distinct kind of 
property. In 1891, the Supreme Court observed that “a man’s name 
is his own property, and has the same right to its use and enjoyment 
as he has to that of any other species of property” [17, p. 677]. Since 
then courts have extended the scope of publicity protection beyond 
an individual’s name to also include his nickname, likeness, a 
character that he created, his performance, his distinctive style, and 
materials closely associated with his personality. 
The rationale for protecting publicity interests is similar to policy 
considerations that underlie copyright laws and is based on the 
argument that “encouragement of individual effort by personal gain 
is the best way to advance public welfare”. Indeed, the right of 
publicity is in many respects similar or even equivalent in many 
respects to copyright. Copyright protects valuable achievements of 
authors, composers, and artists; similarly, the right of publicity 
protects a person’s right in the value of his skills, craft, or talents. 
The main difference between the two doctrines is that for copyright 
protection the expression of a certain idea must be fixed in a 
tangible form; the interest protected in right of publicity is the 
person’s intangible style, his persona. In fact, the boundary between 
copyright and right of publicity is not clearly defined which often 
leads to a conflict between federal policy concerning copyright 
(intellectual property) and state law doctrine of the right of 
publicity (privacy) [17]. 
The right of publicity is “broadly defined (…) as the right to own, 
protect, and profit from the commercial value of an individual’s 
name, likeness, activities, and identity” [17, p. 677]. Normally, it is 
assumed that a person deserves this right because of the work and 
effort she put into developing her persona to be commercially 
valuable. But there are cases where no effort is necessary to reap 
rewards from one’s personality: a naturally beautiful body can lead 






many attributes of perfectly ordinary people are valuable enough 
that businesses are willing to pay for them. Our shopping habits are 
worth the discounts we get from supermarkets, our opinions 
expressed in online surveys (read: information about ourselves) are 
rewarded with a raffle entry. Interestingly, not long ago we would 
say that the information we provide to a supermarket is public; now 
we want it to be protected as private. (A rather cynical observation 
might be that people want protection for this information because 
someone finds it valuable.) The reasons for this change have been 
intensely discussed for a while now [11] and I am not going to 
engage in this discussion. The point is that the distinction between 
the right of publicity (derived from unique personality or style) and 
the standard right of privacy that protects the mundane shopping 
habits is disappearing. In both cases, we are protecting publically 
available information from being used for profit. We are not 
protecting the information from becoming public because it has 
always been public, but from its use that has not been authorized 
by us. We want control over this information. Now, how much of 
the information about ourselves do we want to protect? Clearly, any 
information can be misused so it is impossible to specify a priori 
what type of information deserves protection. But whatever this 
information is, the protection it should receive is similar to what a 
patent or copyright provide, that is, the control of its use. We show 
in the next section how such protection can work in practice. 
 
4   PROTECTING PERSONAL INFORMATION 
 
One of the most comprehensive frameworks for understanding 
privacy has been proposed recently by Daniel Solove in [19]. 
Solove shifts away from the conceptual work on the term “privacy” 
itself and focuses instead on different kinds of activities that 
impinge on privacy. The goal of the taxonomy he develops is to 
identify and understand various types of privacy violations that 
have achieved a significant degree of social recognition. Although 
the primary purpose of the taxonomy is to aid in the development 
of privacy law, it also provides an excellent testing ground for the 
conceptual work on privacy issues. Any viable definition of privacy 
should be able to account for all the cases considered in the 
taxonomy. This is exactly how we will test the concept of 
informational privacy introduced in this paper. We shall proceed by 
reviewing privacy violations discussed by Solove and show that 
whenever these cases refer to informational privacy they can be 
conceptualized as property right violations with respect to personal 
information. This information should receive protection similar to 
trade secrets (if I never authorized its release) or patents 
(otherwise). 
Solove identifies four groups of potentially harmful activities (1) 
information collection, (2) information processing, (3) information 
dissemination, and (4) invasion. Various entities (people, 
businesses, and the government) collect information about an 
individual. This information is then processed (stored, combined, 
manipulated, etc.) and possibly disseminated (released to the public 
or transferred to others).  Invasions involve impingements directly 
on the individual and do not necessarily involve information.  
Information collection includes surveillance and interrogation. 
Surveillance by means of visual or audio eavesdropping is likely 
the oldest type of privacy violation and has been widely recognized 
and criminalized as such. According to our concept of privacy 
surveillance is simply theft of private information similar to theft 
of trade secrets. When someone wiretaps my phone and listens to 
my calls he acquires information that I consider private and since 
does it without my consent he steals it. Our theory explains in a 
straightforward way two borderline or disputable cases of 
surveillance: surveillance in public and covert surveillance (this is 
the case when I never find out that I have been observed and the 
information thus acquired is never used in any way). The first case 
– when surveillance is done in public places – has usually been 
dismissed by courts as privacy violation [2], [24]. Indeed, since the 
information gathered in public surveillance is openly displayed, no 
privacy violation takes place according to our theory either. On the 
other hand, covert surveillance with no damage to the observed 
subject (for example, when all surveillance tapes are destroyed) still 
represents - according to most scholars - a privacy violation. When 
reinterpreted in our theory, this is the case of misappropriation of 
trade secrets. 
Interrogation “is the pressuring of individuals to divulge 
information” [19, p. 500]. The harm elicited through interrogation 
arises from the degree of coerciveness involved. If a neighbor asks 
me about my marital problems and I respond out of politeness, I 
would consider this an invasion of privacy but a minor one. If a 
potential employer asks me about my mental health problems and 
my future employment hinges on the answer (or the refusal to 
provide one), this is serious privacy offence. If one thinks of 
information as property, then an attempt at obtaining that property 
through coercion is a case of extortion. Again, our theory correctly 
identifies it as privacy violation. 
Privacy violations that may happen during information processing, 
the second category in Solove’s taxonomy, include aggregation, 
identification, insecurity, secondary use, and exclusion. In all these 
cases private information has been already provided by an 
individual, but his right to exclusive ownership of this information 
has been compromised. In aggregation, information from different 
sources is combined – without its owner’s permission and often 
also without his knowledge – into a relatively complete profile of a 
person. Consider again an analogy with intellectual property. Apple 
holds a number of patents for iPhone and may sell licenses covered 
by these patents individually to different companies. However, 
Apple would never – presumably – agree to sell these licenses to a 
single company or allow them to be consolidated in a single product 
as it would grant a license to build a legal replica of an iPhone.  
Identification is a special case of aggregation when one piece of 
aggregated information contains the identity of a person. It 
represents privacy violation because personal information is 
revealed by its owner under the condition that it will remain 
anonymous, that is, more information is released than authorized 
by its owners. Insecurity covers the typical cases of ill-protection 
or mishandling of personal information through computer glitches, 
security lapses, abuses and illicit use. When we release personal 




that it will be handled and protected properly. Secondary use is the 
use of data for purposes unrelated to the purposes for which the data 
was initially collected without the data subject’s consent. Again, 
this type of privacy violation is an infringement of the exclusivity 
aspect of information ownership. Lastly, exclusion refers to failure 
to provide individuals with notice and input about their records. 
Federal privacy statuses guard against exclusion by mandating 
transparency and granting individuals the right to access their 
information. If we understand the right to privacy as the exclusive 
right to one’s property then giving out the information to 
institutions or businesses (which is equivalent to leasing it) does 
not give them right to hide this information from us or restrict our 
access to it. 
The third group of privacy violations includes breach of 
confidentiality, disclosure, exposure, increased accessibility, 
blackmail, appropriation, and distortion. Breach of confidentiality, 
disclosure, and exposure cover various aspects of disclosing 
personal information beyond the intentions of its subject and are 
similar to the case of secondary use discussed above. Blackmail 
may involve other threats than just releasing personal information 
so it is only marginally related to the issue of privacy protection. 
Indeed, many cases of blackmail involve the threat of revealing not 
private, but public information which just happens not to be widely 
known. 
Increased accessibility does not involve direct disclosure. Rather, 
information that is already available to the public is made easier to 
access. The classical case is online publication of court records 
which are already publically available in paper form in court 
archives. Legal response to such cases is not uniform. Some courts 
find increased public disclosure harmless [25] whereas some others 
recognized the problem [23]. The likely source of this tension is the 
vagueness of the boundary between private and public domain. 
Indeed, the predicate “private” is a ternary relation with one of the 
arguments being the recipient of the information. The more people 
have access to information about me, the larger scope of this 
information I consider private and would like to hide from them. 
My car’s registration number is public information for all my 
neighbors, but not for the users of Google Street View anywhere in 
the world.  
One of the first cases categorized under the rubric of privacy 
violation involved a flour company using a picture of a minor 
without her consent [15]. This was the case of appropriation: the 
use of one’s identity or personality for the purposes and goals of 
another. Appropriation involves the way an individual desires to 
present herself to society. Interestingly, courts have not been able 
to adequately explain the injury inflicted by appropriation and most 
contemporary cases tend to recognize that the tort of appropriation 
protects a “valuable right of property” [1, p. 375]. In fact, courts 
have transformed the targeted harm from one of appropriation to 
one of intellectual property which agrees quite well our view of 
privacy. 
The last category of privacy violation in the third group involves 
distortion: the manipulation of the way a person is perceived and 
judged by others, and involves the victim being inaccurately 
exposed to the public. Although distortion has been categorized by 
Prosser as one of the four major privacy torts [14], it often does not 
involve the use of personal information. False and defamatory 
statements can be made about any aspect of the person, including 
facts available to the public. When the distorted information is 
personal in nature our theory would classify it as misuse of private 
property. A publisher of an e-book would likely take legal action 
against anyone who modifies that e-book and claims that it is the 
original product of that publisher. 
The last group in Solove’s taxonomy, invasion, covers two cases: 
intrusion and decisional interference. Intrusion is defined here as 
invasion or incursion into one’s life. It disturbs the victim’s daily 
activities, alters her routines, destroys her solitude, and often makes 
her feel uncomfortable and uneasy. Although related to 
informational privacy, intrusions are clearly violations of physical 
or psychological privacy. Decisional interference – government’s 
interference with people’s decisions regarding certain matters of 
their lives – primarily concerns harms to autonomy and liberty, not 
to privacy [5]. Solove’s decision to include decisional interference 
among privacy harms has to with a strong causal relation that it may 
have to actual privacy violations. Thus, neither intrusion nor 





Once we agree to treat private information as property, it can be 
sold, bought, and traded as any other property. Indeed, one can 
imagine creating an exchange market solely for the purpose of 
privacy trading. The idea of National Information Market (NIM), 
where information about individuals can be bought and sold at a 
market price has been proposed several years ago in [6]. Institutions 
gathering information about individuals would be allowed to sell 
baskets of information to other institutions willing to pay for it. 
Individuals would collect fees for the use of their private 
information similar to the system of copyright law established in 
the music industry whereby individual artists can collect fees based 
on use of their music. 
Although Laudon’s idea of NIM has been largely – and unfairly, I 
think – ignored, the idea of privacy as a commodity can be quite 
illuminating. If private information has monetary value, it can be 
quantified. We do not need to go as far as to attach a particular price 
to a piece of private information. But as long as we agree that one 
piece of private information is more valuable than another piece or 
that this piece is more valuable to one individual than to the other, 
we can then design different levels of protection of these pieces. 
One of the most spectacular failures of information technology in 
recent years was the assumption that anonymity guarantees 
privacy. The idea of anonymization, that is, removing personal 
identifiers from data, was intended to provide complete privacy 
protection for individuals. Numerous experiments and case studies 
showed convincingly that anonymized records can be very often re-
identified with the use of publically available auxiliary information 
[20] [12] [8] [9]. Instead of complete privacy, we have no privacy 
at all. But we do not have to think of privacy in terms of these two 





information can be released to some people. One may agree to 
release one’s medical records only to research institutions, but even 
then without information about one’s sexual orientation. Only 
when we treat privacy as a quantifiable object, can we assign 
different levels of protection to its different parts.  
The legal and philosophical aspects of privacy have been discussed 
for over a hundred years now.  But the more recent technological 
challenges of protecting digital data seem unprecedented compared 
to threats to privacy of the past. The technical issues relating to 
privacy protection clearly affect the discussions about the definition 
of privacy at the conceptual level. What are the levels of data 
protection for personal information? What and from whom can we 
hide? How do we measure the cost of personal information that has 
been lost or stolen? What is the cost of data protection? These 
questions can be answered when – perhaps only when - we treat 
personal information as property and the right to privacy as a 
property right. This is not to say that this is the only way we should 
think of privacy, but I conjecture it may be useful in designing ways 
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